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Abstract 
The European Union (EU) has increasingly become a comprehensive security actor. With the development 
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) as a reaction to the failure of the EU to act during the wars in Yugoslavia/Western Balkans in the 
1990s, the EU has a wide range of instruments for crisis prevention, crisis management as well as post-crisis 
intervention at its disposal. Observers typically agree that “hard power” is no longer sufficient to address the 
complex security challenges of today’s world while the EU, often criticised for only utilising “soft power”, is 
now able to exercise “smart power”. Through a comprehensive approach, facilitated by the Lisbon Treaty, the 
EU can now use the various instruments at its disposal, such as diplomacy, development aid, humanitarian 
assistance, trade, sanctions, international cooperation and crisis management capabilities in a joined-up 
manner. This mix of tools and instruments is helping the EU to achieve the aim set out in its European Secu-
rity Strategy: “a secure Europe in a better world”.  
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Introduction 
 
Even though Asian press headlines about Europe 
in the past few years mostly refer to the “Euro-
crisis”, there are many other developments in the 
European Union (EU) which also deserve equal 
attention in Asia. One of which is that the EU has 
increasingly become a comprehensive security 
actor. 
 
Conventionally, security is defined as freedom 
from threat and identified with the security of the 
state. Three assumptions have shaped traditional 
ideas about security: that security is focused on 
states; that security policy seeks to preserve the 
status quo; and that military threats and the need 
for deterrence are the primary concerns.   
 
However, since the end of the Cold War, the 
concept of security in Europe has been broadened 
to take into account not just states, but also 
individuals and communities. It has also moved 
from being status-quo oriented to being more 
future-oriented. Strategic problem solving is more 
about building peace rather than preserving order 
and stability. Most importantly, security is no 
longer synonymous with military threats but has 
been widened to include many other types of 
threats, such as environmental degradation, 
economics, mass refugee movements, and so on. 
Security is now interpreted as meaning more than 
stability or non-war, but one which embraces 
societal and individual dimensions. By the mid-
1990s the concept of “human security”, made 
popular by the 1994 United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) report, had become a widely 
accepted framework.  Some observers find this 
concept too vague, and many now prefer to divide 
the security concept into traditional and non-
traditional security. 
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The development of CFSP and ESDP and the 
European Security Strategy (ESS) 
 
The Maastricht Treaty entered into force in 1993 
against the backdrop of the end of the Cold War 
and German reunification. With this Treaty, the 
European Community was transformed into the 
European Union, composed of three pillars of 
policy cooperation: the European Community, 
Justice and Home Affairs, and the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). While the first 
pillar was supranational, the two others were 
intergovernmental. Through CFSP an additional 
policy initiative was added to the long list of 
policies which had been developed through 
various Treaties since the start of the European 
integration process in the 1950s (for instance, the 
common agricultural policy, common commercial 
policy, internal market). The aim of CFSP was for 
the EU to be a coherent actor on the world stage. 
 
The crisis in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s showed 
that CFSP lacked the instruments to deal with 
such conflict situations, even if they took place in 
the vicinity of the EU. The fact that the war in 
Bosnia could only be stopped in 1995 after the US 
and NATO had intervened was a strong signal to 
European leaders that more was needed. This led 
to a number of changes in the next Treaty, the 
Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force in 
1999. The most important change was the 
creation of the post of High Representative for 
CFSP, who would concurrently be Secretary 
General of the Council (HR/SG). The inspiration 
for this function came from the post of Secretary 
General of NATO and its aim was to give the EU a 
focal point anchored within the EU institutions in 
Brussels, which could provide more visibility and 
continuity. The Treaty also included the setting up 
of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, 
composed of seconded diplomats from member 
states, supporting the work of the High 
Representative to help the EU make a transition to 
a less reactive and more proactive actor in the 
area of international security. Finally, the Treaty 
created the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) as an integral part of CFSP. The aim of 
the ESDP was to provide the EU with an 
autonomous military capability for crisis 
management outside the EU’s borders. Territorial 
defence was left to NATO, an organisation in 
which most EU countries were already members. 
 
When the US and NATO had to intervene once 
more in lieu of European action, this time in 
Kosovo in 1998-1999, European leaders 
acknowledged the need for an ESDP with greater 
capabilities. The bilateral Summit between French 
President Jacques Chirac and UK Prime Minister 
Tony Blair in St. Malo in 1998 and the EU leaders’ 
decision in 1999 to appoint former NATO 
Secretary General Javier Solana as the first High 
Representative for CFSP were both highly 
instrumental in developing the ESDP.  
 
In December 1999 member states agreed on a 
military headline goal, to be reached by 2003, of 
being able to deploy a 60,000-strong corps in six 
weeks and sustain it in the field for a year in 
support of crisis management, humanitarian 
missions and peace-keeping operations. A similar 
civilian headline goal of 5,000 police officers by 
2003 was agreed six months later. 
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In order to support the CFSP and ESDP, new EU 
structures were developed, thereby moving more 
responsibility from the capitals of member states to 
Brussels while maintaining the intergovernmental 
nature of the policy. A number of committees were 
created to ensure member states’ involvement, 
notably a Political and Security Committee (PSC) 
composed of Brussels based ambassadors dealing 
exclusively with CFSP and ESDP (inspired by the 
North Atlantic Council at NATO). In order to provide 
advice to the PSC, a Military Committee composed 
of Brussels based senior military representatives 
and a Civilian Crisis Committee were established. 
As regards the Council Secretariat under HR/SG 
Solana this was expanded to include not only the 
Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (called 
Policy Unit) but also: a military staff, two politico-
military directorates dealing with both military and 
civilian crisis management, and a situation centre. 
These new structures had to work closely with 
existing EU institutions not least the European 
Commission and the rotating six-month member 
state Presidencies. 
 
The year 2003 then saw two important 
developments; first, the launch of the EU’s first 
crisis management operations under ESDP: a 
civilian police mission in Bosnia (EUPM) and a 
military operation in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (ARTEMIS), both under UN Security 
Council mandates. This signalled and confirmed 
that the EU had become operational in the field of 
crisis management. Since then 27 more 
operations and missions have been launched on 
three continents: Europe, Africa and Asia. 
 
Second, the adoption of the European Security 
Strategy (ESS) entitled: “A Secure Europe in a 
Better World”. The strategy, drawn up by HR/SG 
Solana, defines how the EU sees itself as a global 
actor. The text lists the key global challenges and 
threats faced by the EU. These threats include 
terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and 
organised crime. On this basis the strategy 
enumerates the key objectives in addressing the 
threats - building security in the EU’s 
neighbourhood and contributing to  an 
international order based on effective 
multilateralism. The ESS emphasizes the 
comprehensive approach towards security by 
pointing out that none of the threats identified can 
be tackled by purely military means. Instead a 
mixture of instruments is required. For example, 
proliferation can only be contained “through export 
controls and attacked through political, economic 
and other pressures”, while dealing with terrorism 
may “require a mixture of intelligence, police, 
judicial, military and other means”. In resolving 
regional conflicts and failed states, military 
instruments may be needed to restore order and 
undertake humanitarian assistance first, but other 
economic and civilian instruments will need to be 
deployed subsequently to help the reconstruction 
and rebuilding of institutions. 
 
The strategy further emphasises the need for the 
EU and its member states to act together and use 
the different instruments and capabilities in a 
coherent manner in order to achieve the best 
results. The strategy ends by calling for a more 
active, more capable and more coherent EU, 
working with its key partners towards “an effective 
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multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and 
more united world”. 
 
The ESS was slightly updated in 2008 to take 
recent global developments into account. To the 
list of key threats identified in 2003 the following 
were added: piracy, climate change, energy 
security and cyber-attacks. 
 
The ESS became the strategic framework in which 
CFSP, including ESDP, has developed over the 
years. Some have called for an update of the 
strategy, but no agreement has been reached so 
far. 
 
One of the challenges under the Amsterdam 
Treaty was the fact that the various instruments at 
the disposal of the EU for crisis prevention, crisis 
management and post-crisis intervention were 
divided between different EU institutions (Council 
and Commission) and member states. 
Furthermore the use of these instruments had to 
follow different decision-making procedures under 
the responsibility of different political leaders (High 
Representative for CFSP in the Council, 
Commissioners for External Relations and for 
Development in the Commission as well as the 
rotating six-month member state Presidencies). 
This did not make the implementation of the aims 
set out in the European Security Strategy any 
easier. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty: the High 
Representative/Vice-President, the EEAS and 
CSDP 
After many years of negotiations and various 
delays the Lisbon Treaty entered into force at the 
end of 2009. This latest Treaty regulates a 
European Union composed of 27 member states 
(28 when Croatia joins on 1 July 2013) with a total 
population of half a billion people, the world’s 
largest economy and trading block, stretching from 
the Arctic in the North to the shores of North Africa 
and the Middle East in the South, and sharing 
borders with Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, 
Turkey and what was once Yugoslavia in the East. 
 
The aims of the new Treaty were to make the EU 
more democratic and transparent, ensure faster 
and more efficient decision-making, and 
modernise its institutions. The key features were 
the creation of a new institution, the European 
Council, composed of heads of states and 
governments, with a permanent President (a post 
filled by Herman Van Rompuy) and with regard to 
external relations the establishment of a new 
position of High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, who is also Vice-President of 
the Commission (HR/VP) and Chair of the Foreign 
Affairs Council. Baroness Catherine Ashton, who 
became the first holder of this “triple-hatted” 
function, is in fact replacing the High 
Representative for CFSP, the External Relations 
Commissioner in the Commission as well as the 
Foreign Minister under the six-month rotating 
member state Presidencies. In order to carry out 
her various tasks, she is assisted by the European 
External Action Service (EEAS), the EU’s new 
diplomatic corps. 
 
The EEAS started in January 2011 when staff 
from the European Commission (almost all of DG 
External Relations and some from DG 
Development) was merged with staff from the 
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Council Secretariat. In addition, diplomats from 
member states were recruited to bring national 
diplomatic expertise into the Service. The EEAS is 
composed of a headquarters in Brussels and 140 
delegations across the world, covering 170 
countries and all international organisations. The 
EU delegations formally replaced the delegations 
of the European Commission. The EEAS works 
closely with the diplomatic services of the 27 
member states and the European Commission. 
 
In fact, the EEAS at the European level is a 
combination of a “foreign ministry” with 
geographical and thematic desks – covering the 
whole world – and a “defence” or “crisis 
management” ministry – as it also includes a 
military staff (EUMS), a civilian operations 
headquarters (CPCC), an intelligence centre 
(INTCEN) and a situation room (SITROOM) as 
well as directorates for crisis response, security 
and conflict prevention and crisis management 
planning. It works closely with the relevant DGs of 
the European Commission, not least Development 
(DEVCO), Humanitarian assistance (ECHO) and 
Trade and Enlargement, which are under the 
political authority of individual Commissioners. 
 
As mentioned, the new service is under the 
political authority of the HR/VP, Baroness Ashton, 
while also supporting the President of the 
European Council and the President of the 
Commission. Baroness Ashton's role is to conduct 
the CFSP, including the ESDP, renamed Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the Lisbon 
Treaty, and to coordinate the EU’s external action. 
She chairs not only the monthly meetings of EU 
Foreign Ministers, but also the regular meetings of 
Defence Ministers and Development Ministers, 
and is a Vice-President of the Commission. The 
reason for having one person chairing all three 
ministerial discussions and  doing so over a period 
of 5 years, instead of three different individuals for 
six months at a time, as well as being a member of 
the Commission, is to bring coherence and 
continuity into the system. Internally, the HR/VP is 
chairing the crisis management board, which 
brings together around one table in the EEAS all 
the stakeholders in the “EU toolbox”, including 
from the relevant Commission services. 
 
It should also be noted that with the Lisbon Treaty, 
all Committees and working groups dealing with 
external relations have permanent chairs. These 
replace the chairpersons associated with the six-
month rotating member state Presidencies. 
Instead of being attached to the rotating EU 
Presidency, the new arrangement places all staff 
as belonging to the EEAS, ensuring coherence 
and continuity in its operations. 
 
With the Lisbon Treaty, CSDP is still an integral 
part of CFSP, and “it shall provide the Union with 
an operational capacity drawing on civilian and 
military assets”.  These assets are for missions 
outside the EU in view of “peace-keeping, conflict 
prevention and strengthening international 
security” (Treaty of the EU [TEU] art. 42). This 
includes: “joint disarmament operations, 
humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and 
assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-
keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis 
management, including peace-making and post-
conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute 
to the fight against terrorism, including by 
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supporting third countries in combating terrorism in 
their territories” (TEU art. 43). 
 
Since 2003, the EU has launched and conducted 
a total of 29 crisis management operations and 
missions – both military and civilian, of different 
size, on three continents (Europe, Africa and 
Asia), involving a total of 80,000 personnel. Of 
these missions, one-third have been terminated 
and the other two-thirds are still on-going. 
Furthermore, approximately two-thirds of the 
missions are civilian, while the rest are military. 
The chain of command and financing of the two 
types of missions are different, but they all come 
under the political authority of the Council and the 
High Representative and with the Political and 
Security Committee exercising political control and 
strategic direction.  However, the missions are 
increasingly of both civil and military character, 
thus reflecting the comprehensive approach of EU 
crisis management.  
 
The CSDP missions vary significantly in size. The 
largest missions are the civilian rule of law mission 
in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo), which counts 
approximately 2000 personnel, and the military 
anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia 
(EUNAVFOR), which counts approximately 1200 
personnel. Other missions are much smaller with 
some 200 personnel, such as the on-going border 
monitoring mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia) or 
the former monitoring mission in Aceh/Indonesia 
(AMM Aceh).  That being said, however small a 
CSDP-mission might be, its political significance 
cannot be underestimated given its “boots on the 
ground” factor. 
 
With regards to geographical scope, the first 
missions and operations were deployed in the 
EU’s neighbourhood, that is, in the Western 
Balkans (Bosnia and Macedonia), but also in 
Africa (DRC). Later the area of operation was 
expanded to the Caucasus (Georgia), the Middle 
East (Palestinian Territories and Iraq) as well as to 
Asia (Afghanistan and Indonesia). Lately, most 
missions and operations have been launched in 
Africa, not least in the Horn of Africa (off the coast 
of Somalia and in neighbouring states) as well as 
in the Sahel (Niger and Mali). The last mission 
launched in May 2013 is deployed in Libya. There 
is no “out of area” for CSDP-missions, which by 
definition have to take place outside the EU. 
However, some argue that the missions should be 
concentrated in the neighbourhood of the EU, 
whereas others maintain that the EU, as a global 
actor, should be able to deploy crisis management 
operations also far from Europe. 
 
The types of missions have increased over time. 
In the beginning they were mostly composed of 
either military or police personnel. However, based 
on the experience and the demands to the EU, the 
missions today also comprise the following types: 
integrated rule of law (police, but also prosecutors 
and judges), border control and monitoring and 
efforts towards security sector reform. 
 
Almost all missions have been deployed under a 
mandate from the UN Security Council. In the few 
cases where this was not so, the host country has 
invited the EU to deploy its crisis management 
assets on its territory. Most CSDP missions are 
conducted  in close cooperation with  international 
organisations, not least the United Nations and 
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NATO and there are many examples of the EU 
moving in before – or after – a UN peacekeeping 
operation (seen both in the Western Balkans and 
in Africa). With regards to NATO, some military 
CSDP operations are planned and conducted with 
NATO assets (as has been the case in the 
Western Balkans under the so-called “Berlin Plus 
formula”). Other military missions have been 
autonomous and led from one of the EU 
operational headquarters (as has been the case 
for all operations in Africa). However, cooperation 
between EU and NATO is often very close on the 
ground, as EU civilian missions cooperate closely 
with NATO military operations in the same theatre 
(this is presently the case in Kosovo and 
Afghanistan). It should be noted that CSDP 
operations are  increasingly working  with the 
African Union, including its peacekeeping 
missions. 
 
A large number of third countries have participated 
in CSDP missions since the launch of the first 
mission in 2003. Countries like Norway, 
Switzerland, Turkey and Canada are among the 
most frequent contributors to EU crisis 
management operations. It is interesting to note 
that the US is now also contributing to CSDP by 
deploying personnel to EU-led missions in Kosovo 
and in DRC. Of particular interest in an Asian 
context is the participation of five ASEAN member 
states in the EU-led Aceh monitoring mission in 
Indonesia in 2005-2006 (Brunei, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand). 
 
 
 
Smart power: The EU’s comprehensive 
approach  
 
According to the Harvard academic Joseph Nye, 
“soft power” is “the ability to get what you want 
through attraction rather than coercion or 
payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a 
country’s culture, political ideals, and policies”.   
 
The EU (like the US) has generally been 
recognised as having plenty of soft power. 
However, the ongoing economic crisis may have 
led to a decline in the relative strength of this 
influence. It has thus become more difficult for the 
EU to promulgate the fundamental values of 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law 
across the world.  
 
Furthermore, there has been a lot of criticism over 
the years that Europe only has soft power – and 
no “hard power”, commonly defined as military 
might – at its disposal. On the eve of the US 
intervention in Iraq in 2003, the American author 
and analyst Robert Kagan wrote a book entitled 
“Americans are from Mars, Europeans are from 
Venus”, precisely criticising the European “soft 
power” approach. 
 
However, in today’s world “hard power” is no 
longer sufficient to address the complex security 
challenges. This seems to be recognized by most 
observers, especially after the military 
interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and most 
recently in Libya.  A military operation may look 
successful – initially. But if the long term purpose 
of the operation (the so-called strategic “end 
state”) is not achieved, such an intervention 
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cannot be defined as a success. Obviously, there 
can be a clear role for military forces, but only as 
part of a joined- up approach. 
 
Both Europeans and Americans are signing up to 
the concept of “smart power” as the right answer 
to the 21st century security challenges. During her 
Senate confirmation hearing to become US 
Secretary of State in January 2009 Hillary Clinton 
defined “smart power” as “using the full range of 
tools at our disposal – diplomatic, economic, 
military, political, legal and cultural – picking the 
right tool, or combination of tools, for each 
situation”.  She also spoke of the need for the 
three D’s: diplomacy, development and defence. 
 
This is exactly what the EU is doing with its 
“comprehensive approach”, which initially was set 
out in the European Security Strategy in 2003 and 
which has since then greatly benefited from the 
institutional changes in the Lisbon Treaty 
described above. Not least the creation of the 
“triple hatted” HR/VP, the establishment of the 
EEAS as well as the permanent chairs in the 
Committees and working groups dealing with 
external relations, have had a positive impact. 
 
The comprehensive approach implies a systematic 
employment of all the EU instruments available: 
diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, development 
and police and military if necessary. This joined-up 
strategic approach, led and supported by the 
permanent EU institutions and the 27 Member 
States, can address not only the immediate crisis 
but the underlying causes of the security 
challenges and deal with the symptoms in a 
manner which makes the EU an effective foreign 
policy actor.  
 
The best example of the EU’s comprehensive 
approach in applying smart power can be seen in 
how the EU handles the variety of situations in the 
Horn of Africa. This is a region that suffers from 
natural disasters, is struggling with a failed state in 
Somalia, and has to cope with the endemic 
problems that both the natural and man-made 
disasters cause: human trafficking, uncontrolled 
migration, piracy, drug and weapon smuggling, 
contested borders, insurgency and lawlessness.  
 
In order to deal with this complex situation the EU 
has to use different tools made available by its 
institutions and member states.  These include: 
 
1. Developing a strategic framework 
document for the Horn of Africa, describing 
the EU’s interests and objectives and the 
necessary actions to be taken; 
2. Appointing an EU Special Representative 
for the Horn of Africa, to assist in the 
coordination of the many strands of efforts; 
3. Embarking on EUNAVFOR ATALANTA – 
the first EU naval maritime counter-piracy 
operation under CSDP, working closely 
with NATO and other naval forces from 
various countries, in order to deter, 
prevent, capture and lead to the 
prosecution of pirates (comprises approx. 
1200 personnel from almost all the EU’s 27 
member states, 4-7 surface combat 
vessels and 2-4 maritime patrol and 
reconnaissance aircraft);  
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4. Undertaking a military operation under 
CSDP  to train Somali security forces in 
Uganda (EUTM Somalia), which so far has 
trained 3000 Somali troops; 
5. Deploying a civilian capacity building 
mission under CSDP  to develop a regional 
maritime capacity (EUCAP NESTOR) in 
Somalia and the countries of the region so 
they can deal with the challenge of piracy 
themselves; 
6. Financing to fund the African Union 
peacekeeping operation in Somalia, 
AMISOM; 
7. Making available development funds, not 
least to improve security and democratic 
governance in Somalia, but also to assist 
the wider Horn of Africa countries; 
8. Providing humanitarian assistance to assist 
the people affected by the drought; 
9. Supporting   the judiciary in various coastal 
states so they can assist with the 
prosecution and judgment of pirates; and 
10. Undertaking various diplomatic initiatives, 
in close cooperation with international 
organisations such as the UN and the 
African Union, including high level visits to 
Somalia to support the transition and the 
organisation of international conferences in 
Europe. 
 
This smart, comprehensive approach has shown 
positive results as piracy attacks have decreased 
by 95% in the past two years, and Somalia is now 
less of a failed state, with increased security and 
governance. The decrease in piracy is contributing 
to safe passage through the Indian Ocean, not 
only benefitting the coastal states but also for 
Europe and Asia, as this is a key trading route 
between the two regions. 
 
In conclusion, this comprehensive approach 
applied by the European Union towards the 
security challenges on the Horn of Africa, in close 
cooperation with partners such as the UN, African 
Union, NATO, US, as well as navies from Asia, 
including from Singapore, is a concrete example of 
“smart power”. 
 
A similar approach is now being applied by the EU 
in the Sahel region in Africa in order to prevent this 
region in Northern Africa becoming a permanent 
base for international terrorism. Also here the EU 
has developed a strategy, appointed a EUSR, 
deployed CSDP-operations to train local security 
forces in Niger and Mali, and all these combined 
with development and humanitarian assistance 
and diplomatic action in close cooperation with 
other international actors. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The smart power of the EU – based on the 
European Security Strategy and the Lisbon Treaty 
– is also relevant to Asia. Addressing security 
challenges the comprehensive way is part of the 
EU’s engagement with and in Asia. Given that 
Asian countries are becoming the EU’s key trading 
partners, ensuring safe passage in the Indian 
Ocean and preventing the Sahel from becoming a 
new base for international terrorism is also in the 
interests of Asia. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty, with the triple-hatted HR/VP 
and the establishment of the EEAS, has improved 
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the EU’s capacity for applying the comprehensive 
approach, that is, to use all the instruments 
available in a coordinated and joined-up manner. 
Undoubtedly, more can be done to ensure 
coherence, continuity and rapid, efficient decision 
making as well as improved coordination between 
the EEAS and the Commission as well as with 
member states. 
 
The ongoing review of the EEAS, foreseen in the 
Council decision of July 2010, may lead to 
changes in the EEAS, but possibly also in the 
relationship between the EEAS and the 
Commission. Think tanks, the European 
Parliament, some national parliaments as well as 
member states have provided input to the review 
which the HR/VP is expected to present in the 
summer of 2013. Furthermore, the change of all 
the key players at the top of the EU institutions in 
2014 and a new European Commission in 2014 
could also lead to certain changes impacting on 
the EU’s ability to act as comprehensive actor in 
global security.  
 
The scheduled discussion on defence among EU 
heads of state and government at the meeting of 
the European Council in December 2013 may also 
have an impact on the future of CSDP and thus 
the EU’s smart power capabilities. The discussion 
is currently being prepared by the various EU 
bodies, including by the Ministers of Defence and 
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs meeting in the 
Council and by the European Commission. All 
these developments need to be closely watched 
and understood as there could be implications for 
EU’s engagement with Asia. 
 
At this stage however, one can be confident that 
whatever the developments, the objectives of the 
European Security Strategy and the Lisbon Treaty 
are likely to continue to be the same – a safe 
Europe in a better world. 
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